Religious Teaching and Executive Orders

In the third season finale of the West Wing there is a heavy plotline discussion of the virtues and vices of political assassination, a concept certainly ripe for ethical discussion. That aside, there's a single line in there that, when I was young, struck me. As they discuss the principle of the Execute Order, Leo McGarry, the White House Chief of Staff, points something out: A President can rescind his own executive order.

This is not surprising to me. After all, any single body capable of dictating policy is generally also credited with the ability to overturn that policy.

Still, I was having a conversation with a friend, who's very religious, and we were discussing some bits of religious ethics that have never sat particularly well with me and, all of which, I've come to notice, hinge on this sentence of Monarchy Ethics, which allow the High Authority to suspend his own commandments.

I posed to him a few premises that gave him some issues, as a pretty secular ethicist, and I'll explain why those problems arose in a little bit.

The Law proposed by an Omniscient God is Absolutely Right.

In being Absolutely Right, the Law cannot be suspended based on circumstance.

How can God suspend what is Absolutely Right?

These two premises gave him some issues, and that's because he, like any person who believes that a morality can be created and enforced by people, believes that Absolute Right in as intrinsic value, which is to say that if a law is Absolutely Right, it cannot be suspended.

A religious fundamentalist should take issue with the notion of Absolute Right, and here's why:

The value of "Absolute Right" is not intrinsic.

The Law is "Absolute Right" because God says so.

Ergo, if God decides to say something is not Absolutely Right, then that is true.

Basically:

The Law is Good because God says it's Good.

Goodness does not exist on its own merit. It exists based on the opinion of the Universal Curator. This is the religious position (not mine).

With this proposed, we can get to the Biblical issues that we were discussing.

God says in the sixth commandments: Thou shalt not kill.

However, refraining from murderous behavior is only bad if God says it is. There are instances throughout the Bible of God choosing to suspend this verdict, and many occasions when God states that the it is Good to kill.

The same is true for Idolatry as presented in Islam, and could be made manifest (though it might not be) in any monotheistic religion that praises its Divine Ruler as the single authority on the law.

For those who are wondering about the example of Idolatry in Islam that I alluded to, God says there shall be no Idolatry (a point Muslims make clear), but that ruling does not apply to worship of the Kaaba, which becomes a central vessel of worship for Muslims (the very definition of an idol).

This can be reconciled, of course.

However, in the reference that religious leaders so often make to the Brothers Karamazov, that thought that "without God all things are permitted" there is a sense of hypocrisy, and something to be said for dirty pots and kettles.

With the permission of God, we see that which we consider Evil made Good. We cannot acknowledge the existence of a Moral Absolute beyond the Divine Opinion, and any morality dictated by opinion can never be called Absolute.

This, of course, is not a refutation of the religious principles, but rather an observation of the failure of religious ethics to live up to the high principles they claim to possess.

Human Nature and Physiological Predisposition

I hear a lot of talk, as a philosophy student who occasionally deals with ethics (especially Hobbes vs. Locke questions), about human nature and this question of what is innate in human beings, behavioral speaking.

Are we naturally rebellious?

Are we naturally predisposed to order?

What is the innate state of human nature?

In dealing with Locke and Hobbes, and ethics in general, I think this is a terribly important question. I think it's important not simply because Locke and Hobbes want to make use of (Locke) or circumvent (Hobbes) what they see as pieces of human nature, behavioral tendencies in individuals.

"What is human nature?" though, seems like the wrong way of phrasing the question, and here's why:

"Human Nature" is not an individual, isolated function within the body. "Human nature" is not like the kidneys, an individual organ performing a singular specific function. Rather, it is the collection of functions in the body that define what human beings do in an uninhibited state, when not restricted by social laws or manipulation.

It is important to acknowledge that these functions can be understand, that certain innate characteristics are present in human beings, not in an abstract, ethereal sense, but in a physiological, concrete way.

There are two definite patterns in human beings:

1. The human being, because of the way that the brain is organized, has a tendency to pursue that which is pleasurable. We see this in the pursuit of sex and sweet things. Of course, there are certain cases where it may seem as though the human being is indulging in pain (sadomasochism), but they are doing it to serve a function that offers them some degree of pleasure, though perhaps not immediately physical.

2. The human being has an aversion to pain. We spend a good deal of our time avoiding things which are painful, and we create ethical concepts like "white lies" and euthanasia as ways of averting pain in a way which we can perceive as ethical (whether those two things are ethical is not in question at this point).

These patterns, its important to recognize, are built on neurological processes.

The pleasure centers of the brain emerge out of some degree of evolutionary beneficiality (as do the emotional centers). The pain centers emerge out of a need to avoid that which could cause physical harm (we are in pain when we put our hand in fire because we have evolved the feeling of displeasure with that action).

I hesitate to assert that there is more to human nature than that. We search for food when we are hungry because we like the pleasure of eating and want to avert the pain of starvation. This is the source of natural drives among animals, similarly.

The real question that Locke and Hobbes pose is whether the devices created by this desire need to be repressed or released for the continued success of the species and civilization as a whole.

Basically, "Is it good that we are driven by pleasure and pain?" and the corollary "Should it be socially permissible?"

Societies are built on social contracts (whether Rousseau was the one who introduced the concept is beside the point; the system of law had existed before, whether people accepted the social contract by passive participation in society or tried to alter it through revolution). The question is whether or not it should be a part of our society to acknowledge and accept human nature.

Like a Justice trying to slip onto the Supreme Court, I generally answer the question without answering the question.

The answer is: Sometimes.

There are some moments where the visceral, natural response is the right one. When we are pursuing our own happiness by finding chocolate cake and indulging our sweet tooth, that should absolutely be acceptable within the modern social contract. No one questions that there should be a taboo laid out on chocolate cage for those who want it.

Still, there are moments when it is not acceptable. It is not acceptable to kill someone because they are standing on your toe. It may cause you pain and the anger that you feel may be a natural reaction as a result of the human "fight or flight" response, but we can agree that such an act is not permissible in the social contract.

Human nature is relevant to the discussion, as it acts as a perpetual motive for human behavior.

Pascal was right when he made note that "All men seek happiness." It is the cornerstone of any study of human behavior, and needs to be well understood if any practical sociological or governmental system is going to go anywhere.

That aside, we cannot build a social contract on an absolutist understanding of human nature. Absolute freedom with blind trust of the common man will lead to chaos, and the presence of a dictator enforcing policies which bind that same common man are both unacceptable ways of living. There is a happy medium which can and must be understood.

The conversation then evolves into case studies and the circumstantial debate over ethics, and while that does not seem as glamorous or as glorious as an absolute understanding of ethical principle, it's good that we allow moderation to win out over absolutism in this case, as the acceptance of moral absolutes, we learn from Godel, leads to far more problems (and paradoxes) than it can ever solve.

Modern Physiology and the Soul

I spent a portion of my weekend, a few weekends ago, at a conference on philosophy, and there were more than a few presenters on Plato.

Now, I have a lot of problems with the old Greeks (even Epicurus, who’s by far my favorite), but one of the things that came up in a few of the presentations, two of which were specifically on the topic, was the three part soul, according to Plato, and this is a major sticking point for me.

For those who haven’t read book four of the Republic, the statement of the soul is pretty simple. This soul consists of three parts:

Logos – The rational mind
Thymos – The emotion, spiritedness (generally considered masculine)
Eros – The appetite, desire (generally considered feminine)

Now, of course, all of this makes sense in the context of Plato, who noticed that there are three distinct functions in the individual. That we have the capacity for logic, we have a certain degree of desire and that we sometimes see the need to fight, to stand up for something. These are the three functions that he is trying to showcase.

I have no problem with Plato for presenting these three functions. My problem is with the attribution of these functions to the soul.

I am, by no means, an expert in physiology, but it seems to me that these three functions can be explained physiologically.

We know that the temporal lobe controls our capacity for foresight and reason. We know that the adrenal glands fuel the fight or flight reaction. We know that the limbic system controls most of our visceral emotional reactions, including many of our desires (that which do not come from other physiological components, like the physical hunger felt in a starved stomach).

With this new data present, doesn’t this undermine Plato’s version of the soul?

When I presented this to the young man on stage he responded by saying that it does, which I’m glad he did (because it was very intellectually honest of him, in my opinion). He then went on to explain that in the context of Plato’s time, Plato’s soul is a very powerful device. That’s fair, but it doesn’t explain why were should continue discussing his version of the soul in a time when we know it does not exist.

After posing the question, I had a few issues and a few ideas.

The first is something I’ve known for a while, but thought was worth bringing up, as the debate over the existence of a soul hinges on this:

The existence of something can be verified through its function. Which is to say, if something performs a function, then we can be sure that it exists.

I am fairly comfortable with that criteria for existence. It’s a criteria I have used for some time, and while it generally takes some explanation for people who don’t understand that being the object of a verb (like, say, if something is seen) is performing a function, it’s a solid qualifier once we get around that point.

That said, what is the function of a soul?

We’ve removed Plato’s functions, as they are performed by something else entirely.

The function of creation is not entirely understood, but it largely assumed to be the product of the physical brain and interactions within various structures (Dr. V.S. Ramachandran has some very interesting statements about the root of creativity based on interactions within the brain).

The function of consciousness is no longer explained through the use of the soul (which was the placeholder for some time). The top students of consciousness now recognize it as the product of neurology within the brain.

The capacity for morality can be largely attributed to the consideration of consequences, which is a function performed by the temporal lobe, which gives us that ability to make predictions.

So, what is the function of the soul? What function does it still act as a placeholder for, that we do not already have at least a rudimentary understanding of?

In the age of science, is this conceptualization of a part of ourselves that is inexplicable really necessary? Is it true?

I concede that I lean towards denying the existence of a soul categorically, as I cannot find a function, but it is an open question and, if such a function can be demonstrated, I would be very happy to see it.

Youtube and Retroviral Memes

Since I presented a paper last weekend on one of the impacts that the internet has had on memetics that is pretty well exemplified through wikipedia, I thought I’d post something on another impact that the state of the internet has had on the memes themselves, and the way they travel.

The more I deal with youtube, the more I realize how incredible it is as a way of transmitting information. It’s not all, what some would consider, “high quality” information (though, since you can actually get access to clips from popular news and television shows, as well as full length lecture, on youtube, so some of it is), but the memes themselves are incredibly viral.

Because of the way that television and radio transmits, with memes only reproduced every so often (a piece of music on the radio might get one play a day), there is a limit to the amount of replication. Not only is the replication limited by the transmission, but by the lack of control listeners have over content, so they can’t replay the same memes over and over, or select which memes (or group of memes) they’re going to focus on.

As a result, the advent of youtube, which allowed for people to pick and choose which memes they wanted to listen to or watch, and to select all of their own content, offered a whole new way of transmitting memes.

There were viral memes in the age before the internet. We can’t forget that there are certain ideas that have absolutely taken over society purely by way of the television, radio and printing presses. Beatle-mania and Bible-mania were both, certainly, viral.

But it’s unfair to classify what has happened in the internet age in the same way we might classify what happened to earlier cultural phenomena. After all, these memes process and fade much quicker, but they also replicate much faster as a result of the medium.

A lot of this is a result of the user-based content on youtube. The fact that people can post their own content means there are far more memes in circulation. This, as a result, means that the memes which permeate the social membrane, which enter our consciousness and conversation are far more viral, having been forced through a far more competitive process.

Still, what’s interesting is the replicating medium for memes.

The memes themselves replicate at a rate which is more than just viral. Viral memes, historically, take some time to evolve and set in. These memes are far more quick.

I’ve been playing a lot with the connection between the retroviral replicators observed in HIV/AIDS as opposed to the replicators of a typical gene. Because HIV/AIDS is a retrovirus, it’s ability to reproduce and mutate are far faster than the species it is competing with, as well as the immune systems of the creatures it infects, this increased replication and method for increasing mutation is a lot like what youtube offers. Of course, one might argue that it happens without the epidemic, but youtube really is a social virus of epic proportions.

The youtube replicator has drastically increased the speed at which memes travel, and the way in which they are transmitted and mutate.

The case study of Susan Boyle is an interesting one, as her performance on Britain’s Got Talent is a meme that probably would never have gotten to the United States without the retroviral replicator, but, at last count, she has close to forty-five million replications on a single copy of the video.

Anyway, it’s just a thought.

It’s impossible to deny that the internet has drastically shifted the way that memes travel and the way that they replicate, as well as the way that they are linked together (which is what I discussed in my paper last weekend). It’s important that the people who really focus on memetics start to consider the impacts of these changes, because I think they are far more powerful, socially, then that of people knowing about a 42 year old singer. Hopefully I’ll post more about that later.

On Pain

I'd say that I've been on an Eastern Philosophy kick lately, but that would be a lie. My entire life is an an acid trip on Eastern Philosophy, it's just been more properly indulged this semester, as I'm taking a Buddhism class that's given me the opportunity to read a lot of first hand documents I usually wouldn't.

There are a lot of things worth talking about, but it's usually good to start at the beginning and, with Buddhist philosophy, that means starting with the First Noble truth:

In life there is suffering.

Now, every western philosophy either dismisses suffering as something that can be overcome, in large part, with the indulgence of joy or it channels our masochism (a la Nietzsche).

This puts me in a problematic state, as I neither want to simply ignore the existence of suffering, nor do I want to pretend that suffering is the be all and the end all. Suffering doesn't need to be the epicenter of our lives, but casting it out is no good.

In my personal life, I have dealt with enough suffering that I do not need to do as Nietzsche sometimes proposes, make that suffering unbearable. Instead, I learn from what suffering I have to deal with, take the lessons as they come, and then work in pursuit of happiness.

Epicurus was on to something when he acknowledged that there is great joy to be had, when he wrote on pleasure. In fairness, the Kama Sutra beat him to the punch, but it's still an excellent point.

Life can be a bitch and life can be good. We don't need to live in one life all the time, and almost nobody does (which is a good thing).

Joy is worth pursuing, and since I've been doing a lot of work with this form of ethos lately, I'm sure I'll get into it a little more later, but let's simplify it.

The Buddha's truth suggests "in life there is suffering." What the Buddha means to say is that life is empty and that even our Epicurean joys are not enough to fulfill ourselves. On this point I politely dissent.

Live through joy, and savor it, but also endure and learn from suffering. There is enough suffering in most lives that it does not need to be enhanced by Nietzschean masochism.

On Love

When I admit that I don't believe in god, or fate, or souls, people often ask me if I believe in "true love." It seems like a jump, but I can see where it comes from.

The part of the phrase that bothers me is the "true" part. Tolkein wrote, in a letter:

Nearly all marriages, even happy ones, are mistakes: in the sense that almost certainly (in a more perfect world, or even with a little more care in this very imperfect one) both partners might be found more suitable mates. But the real soul-mate is the one you are actually married to.

Sometimes people freak out and say "you're not a romantic, then."

If romanticism is defined by the insistence that there is one person out there who I can love for the rest of my life, then I am most expressly not a romantic. However, I don't believe that's what romanticism is, nor do I believe that love is about finding someone and being together forever.

Some people insist that love is instant, that when it comes it is like a bolt of lightening, and it strikes you and you are changed forever.

To me, love is like a flower. You plant it with someone that you care about, someone that you like and think is interesting, then you cultivate it, through experiences and understandings and discoveries about one another. Love is not something we receive, it is something we build through compassion and mutual affection.

It's Valentine's Day, which is an opportunity to cultivate love, if you have it, or simply enjoy the prospect (like I do). Enjoy the day.

What We Call Randomness

I'm reading Dan Dennett's book Freedom Evolves. I'm about 120 pages in, and it's absolutely wonderful. Anyone who likes Dennett will like the book, and anyone who's read his other stuff will find it enriching, as it helps to tie the ideas together.

I've considered what it means to be "random." In acknowledging, as I often have (as a determinist, or at least I think I am) that the outcome of a situation is dictated by the conditions leading up to it, I've been forced to reconsider a definition of the term "random." After all, it'd be silly to throw away perfectly good word.

The point, though, is that I think I've found a way to change my understanding of the adjective without changing the nouns that it speaks for.

When we engage in a "random" coin flip, we are not engaging in randomness in that conventional sense, as the result of the coin flip is predetermined by the nature of physics, the forces exerted by the thumb that does the flipping, gravity, air resistance and any number of other things.

What we are actually doing is availing our decision to forces outside of our mind. What we are doing is taking that internal mechanism, that thought process that leads to decisions, and circumventing it by making the decision contingent, not on our past experience or our current inclinations, but on the laws of physics and the forces on a coin.

Randomness becomes an expression of sacrificing control. When you consider this, you may acknowledge that this is already something that you thought about randomness, that this was already the definition.

Random means, literally, an occurrence without aim.

That is what we need to redefine randomness as. Occurrence without intention, not "occurrence without cause," which is the present definition.

Occurrence without cause is not possible. Occurrence without intention makes sense.