Pro-Life, Kinda

In memory of the late Dr. George Tiller.

The murder of Dr. George Tiller is not something that should be taken lightly and I have debated using it as an opportunity to raise what I think is a serious difficulty of the rhetorical "pro-life" position.

Of course, I don't refer to anti-abortion activists as pro-life, because I don't think they are. I refer to them as "anti-choice" or "anti-abortion," as I feel those are fair characterizations of the position.

The reason I use the term is that, it seems to me, that those who advocate for "life" don't actually advocate for life in all instances. What they're advocating for is fetal rights, generally out of the belief in a soul instilled at conception.

I could point out, easily, that alleged "pro-life" activists generally don't object to the killing of doctors who perform abortions. That's not entirely true, though, and it would be silly to make such a gross generalization. Of course, those who do advocate the murder of physicians have absolutely no right to use the term, and their hypocrisy should be noted and thrown in their face at every opportunity. As should the hypocrisy of those who don't openly decry the act.

The reason why I don't think there are really "pro-life" activists, though, is simple.

If you are truly "pro-life," if you advocate the defense of life under all circumstances, you must adhere to that as a primary principle, and very few actually do (I'll get to those rare instances later).

That means opposing the termination of life:

as retributive punishment

as a means of defending oneself or ones property

as a means of spreading political ideology

These are the three primary situations, and while many may oppose capital punishment (an issue on which Mike Huckabee is consistent), very few would object to the termination of life for the starting of a war. For Christians, this is problematic, as Christianity has deep roots in spreading itself through war, and it's a problem for Republicans (where we find the most vehement in the use of the term "pro-life") who support the war in Iraq, or in any other country.

Of course, the termination of life as a means of defending oneself seems like a huge leap. It may seem like a dramatic extension of the position, but if it is true that life is sacred, then it needs to be a part of the principle that life cannot be taken by one who adheres to a truly "pro-life" position.

The position of those who wield the rhetorical title, though, is not based on the preservation of life. It does not adhere to the rhetorical position they claim to espouse, which is:

Life is sacred. Period.

What they mean to say is that the life of a fetus is as much a life as that of a full grown adult, but the fetus cannot defend itself.

This is a logical position (at least in that it is a conclusion based on premises, not in that it is logical) on which I disagree.

I do not think that the life of a fetus is equivalent to the life of a full grown individual, but this is a position that I may go into at another point. It's not so much that it's a long argument, but rather that it's an argument that deserves its own time.

My point is not that the anti-abortion lobbyists are wrong (they are, in my opinion, but that is not my point, at this particular moment).

My point is that they do not manifest the rhetorical position that they claim as their own. They embrace the title of "pro-life" happily, because it sounds great. I mean, we all agree that life is a good thing. Of course, they're not in favor of life in all circumstances.

Their position has its own logic, but they're not "pro-life."

"Good" Memes

As this blog was initially started to document personal thoughts, I figured I might as well do some of that.

I've been working on adding footnotes and adding an addendum to the journal article I presented a while ago. I've been learning that the academic world is slower than I personally would like it to be, but that's another issue.

Every time I begin to discuss the new advance in memetics that the article discusses on the connectedness of memes in the public consciousness, I am faced by a persistent and annoying question.

Is it good?

Of course, this is a question about the technology.

Is it good that the internet allows us to communicate so much faster?

Is it good for our culture?

Is it good for the quality of information?

I object to the question, of course. This is not uncommon. Much of the time, a question built to commandeer a conversation is objectionable, and this is one of those occasions.

The objection is on two grounds.

The first is that it doesn't make a damn bit of difference. If technology is going to have an impact, it's going to have an impact, and we can't (and shouldn't) sacrifice technology because of it. The advance in technology is not simply good, but necessary.

The second is that it's not really offering an arbitrary criteria for good.

Is good a matter of the beneficiality for us, for human beings, as a species? Or is good a matter of increasing the success of memes?

Of course, it seems obvious to the person asking the question that they were inquiring about the first one, but I make the differentiation intentionally.

As memes develop, as they evolve, they are not at all concerned with us. Dawkins makes a point of that in the Selfish Gene, when the concept was introduced, but it is clear simply through observation. The memes use us when they need to, they destroy us when it suits them better. They operate on their own prerogative (it's not a conscious decision, but rather one dictated by the circumstances under which they evolve; that's not important, though).

If we want the memes to be good in that first sense then we have to make a point of propagating the memes that are beneficial.

Some regard this as a sort of memetic eugenics, like artificial selection. It's not. It's a natural selection. As a medium of replication (and, make no mistake, the human being is a medium of replication), its within our best interest to select in favor of memes that are beneficial. That's a natural function, and part of the role we play as meme machines.

So, as cliche as it sounds, the memes have always been what we make them. The technology changes those memes, but they are still what we make them.

Dan Dennett talks about waging a war on destructive memes, and this is a good idea. Natural selection tends, historically, in favor of memes that advance the survival of their hosts, but that is not always true, and some of the most successful memes are destructive ones.

It is important that we find ways to minimize those destructive memes, maximize the success of the memes most beneficial for us.

This, of course, is the general purpose of my endnote, but it really isn't fair to write an addendum to address a question that I then claim is a stupid one. It also seems a bit nonsensical to answer a question that I think is stupid (though I find that I do it a lot of the time).

Anyway, as this is what my life is coming to, I figure it might be worth writing about.

Religious Teaching and Executive Orders

In the third season finale of the West Wing there is a heavy plotline discussion of the virtues and vices of political assassination, a concept certainly ripe for ethical discussion. That aside, there's a single line in there that, when I was young, struck me. As they discuss the principle of the Execute Order, Leo McGarry, the White House Chief of Staff, points something out: A President can rescind his own executive order.

This is not surprising to me. After all, any single body capable of dictating policy is generally also credited with the ability to overturn that policy.

Still, I was having a conversation with a friend, who's very religious, and we were discussing some bits of religious ethics that have never sat particularly well with me and, all of which, I've come to notice, hinge on this sentence of Monarchy Ethics, which allow the High Authority to suspend his own commandments.

I posed to him a few premises that gave him some issues, as a pretty secular ethicist, and I'll explain why those problems arose in a little bit.

The Law proposed by an Omniscient God is Absolutely Right.

In being Absolutely Right, the Law cannot be suspended based on circumstance.

How can God suspend what is Absolutely Right?

These two premises gave him some issues, and that's because he, like any person who believes that a morality can be created and enforced by people, believes that Absolute Right in as intrinsic value, which is to say that if a law is Absolutely Right, it cannot be suspended.

A religious fundamentalist should take issue with the notion of Absolute Right, and here's why:

The value of "Absolute Right" is not intrinsic.

The Law is "Absolute Right" because God says so.

Ergo, if God decides to say something is not Absolutely Right, then that is true.

Basically:

The Law is Good because God says it's Good.

Goodness does not exist on its own merit. It exists based on the opinion of the Universal Curator. This is the religious position (not mine).

With this proposed, we can get to the Biblical issues that we were discussing.

God says in the sixth commandments: Thou shalt not kill.

However, refraining from murderous behavior is only bad if God says it is. There are instances throughout the Bible of God choosing to suspend this verdict, and many occasions when God states that the it is Good to kill.

The same is true for Idolatry as presented in Islam, and could be made manifest (though it might not be) in any monotheistic religion that praises its Divine Ruler as the single authority on the law.

For those who are wondering about the example of Idolatry in Islam that I alluded to, God says there shall be no Idolatry (a point Muslims make clear), but that ruling does not apply to worship of the Kaaba, which becomes a central vessel of worship for Muslims (the very definition of an idol).

This can be reconciled, of course.

However, in the reference that religious leaders so often make to the Brothers Karamazov, that thought that "without God all things are permitted" there is a sense of hypocrisy, and something to be said for dirty pots and kettles.

With the permission of God, we see that which we consider Evil made Good. We cannot acknowledge the existence of a Moral Absolute beyond the Divine Opinion, and any morality dictated by opinion can never be called Absolute.

This, of course, is not a refutation of the religious principles, but rather an observation of the failure of religious ethics to live up to the high principles they claim to possess.

Human Nature and Physiological Predisposition

I hear a lot of talk, as a philosophy student who occasionally deals with ethics (especially Hobbes vs. Locke questions), about human nature and this question of what is innate in human beings, behavioral speaking.

Are we naturally rebellious?

Are we naturally predisposed to order?

What is the innate state of human nature?

In dealing with Locke and Hobbes, and ethics in general, I think this is a terribly important question. I think it's important not simply because Locke and Hobbes want to make use of (Locke) or circumvent (Hobbes) what they see as pieces of human nature, behavioral tendencies in individuals.

"What is human nature?" though, seems like the wrong way of phrasing the question, and here's why:

"Human Nature" is not an individual, isolated function within the body. "Human nature" is not like the kidneys, an individual organ performing a singular specific function. Rather, it is the collection of functions in the body that define what human beings do in an uninhibited state, when not restricted by social laws or manipulation.

It is important to acknowledge that these functions can be understand, that certain innate characteristics are present in human beings, not in an abstract, ethereal sense, but in a physiological, concrete way.

There are two definite patterns in human beings:

1. The human being, because of the way that the brain is organized, has a tendency to pursue that which is pleasurable. We see this in the pursuit of sex and sweet things. Of course, there are certain cases where it may seem as though the human being is indulging in pain (sadomasochism), but they are doing it to serve a function that offers them some degree of pleasure, though perhaps not immediately physical.

2. The human being has an aversion to pain. We spend a good deal of our time avoiding things which are painful, and we create ethical concepts like "white lies" and euthanasia as ways of averting pain in a way which we can perceive as ethical (whether those two things are ethical is not in question at this point).

These patterns, its important to recognize, are built on neurological processes.

The pleasure centers of the brain emerge out of some degree of evolutionary beneficiality (as do the emotional centers). The pain centers emerge out of a need to avoid that which could cause physical harm (we are in pain when we put our hand in fire because we have evolved the feeling of displeasure with that action).

I hesitate to assert that there is more to human nature than that. We search for food when we are hungry because we like the pleasure of eating and want to avert the pain of starvation. This is the source of natural drives among animals, similarly.

The real question that Locke and Hobbes pose is whether the devices created by this desire need to be repressed or released for the continued success of the species and civilization as a whole.

Basically, "Is it good that we are driven by pleasure and pain?" and the corollary "Should it be socially permissible?"

Societies are built on social contracts (whether Rousseau was the one who introduced the concept is beside the point; the system of law had existed before, whether people accepted the social contract by passive participation in society or tried to alter it through revolution). The question is whether or not it should be a part of our society to acknowledge and accept human nature.

Like a Justice trying to slip onto the Supreme Court, I generally answer the question without answering the question.

The answer is: Sometimes.

There are some moments where the visceral, natural response is the right one. When we are pursuing our own happiness by finding chocolate cake and indulging our sweet tooth, that should absolutely be acceptable within the modern social contract. No one questions that there should be a taboo laid out on chocolate cage for those who want it.

Still, there are moments when it is not acceptable. It is not acceptable to kill someone because they are standing on your toe. It may cause you pain and the anger that you feel may be a natural reaction as a result of the human "fight or flight" response, but we can agree that such an act is not permissible in the social contract.

Human nature is relevant to the discussion, as it acts as a perpetual motive for human behavior.

Pascal was right when he made note that "All men seek happiness." It is the cornerstone of any study of human behavior, and needs to be well understood if any practical sociological or governmental system is going to go anywhere.

That aside, we cannot build a social contract on an absolutist understanding of human nature. Absolute freedom with blind trust of the common man will lead to chaos, and the presence of a dictator enforcing policies which bind that same common man are both unacceptable ways of living. There is a happy medium which can and must be understood.

The conversation then evolves into case studies and the circumstantial debate over ethics, and while that does not seem as glamorous or as glorious as an absolute understanding of ethical principle, it's good that we allow moderation to win out over absolutism in this case, as the acceptance of moral absolutes, we learn from Godel, leads to far more problems (and paradoxes) than it can ever solve.

Modern Physiology and the Soul

I spent a portion of my weekend, a few weekends ago, at a conference on philosophy, and there were more than a few presenters on Plato.

Now, I have a lot of problems with the old Greeks (even Epicurus, who’s by far my favorite), but one of the things that came up in a few of the presentations, two of which were specifically on the topic, was the three part soul, according to Plato, and this is a major sticking point for me.

For those who haven’t read book four of the Republic, the statement of the soul is pretty simple. This soul consists of three parts:

Logos – The rational mind
Thymos – The emotion, spiritedness (generally considered masculine)
Eros – The appetite, desire (generally considered feminine)

Now, of course, all of this makes sense in the context of Plato, who noticed that there are three distinct functions in the individual. That we have the capacity for logic, we have a certain degree of desire and that we sometimes see the need to fight, to stand up for something. These are the three functions that he is trying to showcase.

I have no problem with Plato for presenting these three functions. My problem is with the attribution of these functions to the soul.

I am, by no means, an expert in physiology, but it seems to me that these three functions can be explained physiologically.

We know that the temporal lobe controls our capacity for foresight and reason. We know that the adrenal glands fuel the fight or flight reaction. We know that the limbic system controls most of our visceral emotional reactions, including many of our desires (that which do not come from other physiological components, like the physical hunger felt in a starved stomach).

With this new data present, doesn’t this undermine Plato’s version of the soul?

When I presented this to the young man on stage he responded by saying that it does, which I’m glad he did (because it was very intellectually honest of him, in my opinion). He then went on to explain that in the context of Plato’s time, Plato’s soul is a very powerful device. That’s fair, but it doesn’t explain why were should continue discussing his version of the soul in a time when we know it does not exist.

After posing the question, I had a few issues and a few ideas.

The first is something I’ve known for a while, but thought was worth bringing up, as the debate over the existence of a soul hinges on this:

The existence of something can be verified through its function. Which is to say, if something performs a function, then we can be sure that it exists.

I am fairly comfortable with that criteria for existence. It’s a criteria I have used for some time, and while it generally takes some explanation for people who don’t understand that being the object of a verb (like, say, if something is seen) is performing a function, it’s a solid qualifier once we get around that point.

That said, what is the function of a soul?

We’ve removed Plato’s functions, as they are performed by something else entirely.

The function of creation is not entirely understood, but it largely assumed to be the product of the physical brain and interactions within various structures (Dr. V.S. Ramachandran has some very interesting statements about the root of creativity based on interactions within the brain).

The function of consciousness is no longer explained through the use of the soul (which was the placeholder for some time). The top students of consciousness now recognize it as the product of neurology within the brain.

The capacity for morality can be largely attributed to the consideration of consequences, which is a function performed by the temporal lobe, which gives us that ability to make predictions.

So, what is the function of the soul? What function does it still act as a placeholder for, that we do not already have at least a rudimentary understanding of?

In the age of science, is this conceptualization of a part of ourselves that is inexplicable really necessary? Is it true?

I concede that I lean towards denying the existence of a soul categorically, as I cannot find a function, but it is an open question and, if such a function can be demonstrated, I would be very happy to see it.